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Rethinking Indivisibility:Towards A
Theory of Supporting Relations between
Human Rights
James W Nickel*
ABSTRACT
Indivisibility is the idea that no human right can be fully realized without
fully realizing all other human rights. When indivisibility occurs it has
the practical consequence that countries cannot pick and choose among
rights. This article offers a framework for understanding supporting relations
between rights and gives a number of arguments against strong claims of
indivisibility. A central thesis is that the strength of supporting relations
between rights varies with quality of implementation. Rights with low
quality implementation provide little support to other rights. This is why
early UN formulations of indivisibility said that it occurs when the rights
in question are fully realized. Even if strong claims about the indivisibility
were true under high quality implementation, they would be of limited
relevance to developing countries because high quality implementation of
rights is generally not an immediate possibility in those countries. Developing countries do not run afoul of indivisibility if they implement some
rights before others.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Within a system of successfully implemented human rights, many rights
support and reinforce other rights. For example, due process rights support
*
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the fundamental freedoms by constraining abuses of the criminal law that
undermine those freedoms. Due process rights also support equality rights
by blocking some manifestations of racism in criminal trials. Awareness that
many supporting relations exist among rights has led to grand claims that
all human rights are interdependent and indivisible.
The indivisibility of human rights is an official doctrine of the United
Nations, supported both by the General Assembly and by the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights. An early statement is found in the
1968 Proclamation of Teheran: "Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil and political rights without
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible."1 The
UN General Assembly endorsed the indivisibility thesis in a 1977 resolution,
dropping the important qualification about full realization (the importance of
this qualification isexplained below). The indivisibility thesis was reaffirmed
in the 1993 Vienna Declaration, again without the qualification: "All human
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis."2 The political
aim of the first two resolutions was to defend economic and social rights,
to say that countries endorsing civil and political rights are also committed
to endorsing economic and social rights. The statement about interdependence in the Vienna Declaration had other aims as well; it was directed to
or
countries endorsing most human rights while rejecting women's rights
3
rights of democratic participation as inappropriate to their societies.
Some will be tempted to view claims of interdependence and indivisibility as high flown political rhetoric without much content, as saying little
more than "Hurray for taking all types of human rights seriously!" or "Boo
to those who try to pick and choose among human rights!" This deflationary
temptation will be provisionally resisted. Instead, this article will take these
claims at face value and consider whether they are defensible and how
much they need to be qualified. The overall goal is Socratic: to sow doubt
about indivisibility that stimulates reflection and deeper understanding, not
to show that some families of human rights are unjustified.4
1.
2.

3.

Proclamation of Teheran, International Conference on Human Rights, 22 Apr.-13 May
1968,
13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/b tehern.htm.
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts.,
48th Sess., 22d plen. mtg., part I, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), reprinted in
32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993).
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(2000).
4.

For the author's views on the justification of human rights, see JAMESW. NICKEL, MAKING
SENSEOF HUMAN RIGHTS 53-91, 136-53 (2d ed. 2006). Chapter 9 constructs a justification
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There are at least three levels at which supporting relations can be investigated. The broadest and most abstract-and also the most familiar-explores
supporting relations at the level of two grand families of human rights: "civil
and political rights" on the one hand and "economic and social rights" on the
other. This broad perspective keeps things simple but is not very penetrating.
To achieve the most detailed understanding we could take each particular
right and put it together with every one of the others in order to see which
supporting relations exist. We might take a particular right such as the right
to freedom of association and ask whether and how it supports other specific
rights such as the right to a fair trial, the right to vote, or the right to equality
before the law. Looking at relations between particular rights is illuminating and cannot ultimately be avoided, but fully realizing this perspective
requires much tedious work. If there are forty particular human rights, then
combining them into pairs yields 1560 places where supporting relations
may exist.' Maximal penetration comes at the cost of great complication.
An intermediate perspective uses several families of rights, combining each
family with every one of the others in order to see which supporting relations exist. Using a scheme of seven families, this approach offers the best
balance of penetration and manageability. The seven families are (1) security
rights, (2) due process rights, (3) fundamental personal freedoms, (4) rights of
political participation, (5) equality rights, (6) social rights, and (7) minority
and group rights. 6 Combining the seven families into pairs yields forty-two
possible supporting relations. For example, we could begin by asking of
security rights whether and how strongly they support due process rights,
fundamental personal freedoms, rights of political participation, equality
rights, social rights, and minority and group rights.
It would be helpful to know not only which, if any, supporting relations
exist between each pair of families, but also the strength of those supports.
For example, it would be good to know how much, if any, support the
fundamental personal freedoms provide to equality rights. It seems likely
that these freedoms (unlike rights of political expression and participation)
provide little support to equality rights. In pursuit of a better view of supporting relations we might work up a view of what major protections each
family is likely to provide once it is implemented, as well as a view of what
main threats each family faces. Claims about supporting relations involve
both normative propositions (such as ones setting out the main threats to a
family of rights)7 and empirical propositions, ones about what one part of a
5. Forty times forty equals 1600, but we can ignore the forty relations of rights to themselves.
6. NICKEL, supra note 4, at 93-94.
7. Conceptions of the main threats to the realization of rights have a normative dimension
because they involve views about the strength of tendencies to do particular kinds of evil
in individuals, governments, and groups. For example, one's view of the strength and
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social and legal system contributes to another part. The empirical claims are
not easily settled from an armchair-unless the person in the chair already
has an enormous knowledge of history, law, and politics.8 Further, concepts
such as "interdependence," "support," "indispensability," and "indivisibility"
are more complex than they first appear, and the nature and strengths of
supporting relations may vary by country. Such variation occurs because
different countries experience somewhat different threats to rights and use
different means of implementation. A right that is indispensable to another
at a high threat level may be merely useful when the threat level is low.
The second section of this article lays out a scheme for understanding
interdependence and indivisibility, arguing that indivisibility is a very strong
form of interdependence. Section three argues that the strength of supporting
relations between rights depends heavily on how well the rights are implemented. Rights with high quality implementation provide more support to
other rights than ones with low quality implementation. The fourth section
argues against system-wide indivisibility. The fifth section argues that claims
about the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights have much
less relevance to developing countries than is generally realized. Section six
analyzes linkage arguments-defenses of a controversial right that appeal to
the valuable support it provides for an uncontroversial right.

II. SUPPORTING RELATIONS, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND
INDIVISIBILITY
Indivisibility and interdependence are not the same. Many more rights are
interdependent than are indivisible. Indivisibility is a very strong form of
interdependence (or bidirectional support).9
A supporting relation between two things exists when one of them
contributes to the functioning or stability of another. Without the support,

universality of the tendency to discriminate along racial and ethnic lines will make a
big difference in what protections against discrimination one takes to be necessary-and
thus affect one's views about what supports from other rights are useful and indispensable. If one thought that only some countries are infected by serious racism then one
might reject the claim that all countries need strong equality rights to combat racial and
ethnic discrimination. This in turn might lead one to reject the claim that all countries
need to use security and due process rights to provide strong supports for rights against
discrimination.
8. For example, it would be useful for the theorist or international lawyer in the armchair
to know whether Castro's Cuba proved in practice that it is possible to fully implement
social rights without fully implementing the fundamental personal freedoms and rights
of political participation.
9. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that rights are only supported by other rights. Many
other factors support rights. The effective functioning of rights is supported, for example,
by strong economies, tolerant and fair-minded people, and the absence of civil war.
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the second thing would function less well or be less stable. Here the focus
is on supporting relations between two rights (or families of rights) held by
everyone. 10
Respecting and implementing one right can promote the realization
of another right by: (1) protecting against some of the main threats to the
supported right, as when effective implementation of a right to freedom of
movement protects against those violations of the right to freedom of assembly that block people from moving to the location of the assembly; (2)
providing a remedy or process that is sometimes, often, or always useful in
protecting the supported right-such as the assistance the right of access to
the courts sometimes provides to other rights by making available remedies
for their violation; (3) making the institutions and procedures used to implement the supported right less vulnerable to corruption and abuse, as when
rights of democratic participation subject governmental officials to democratic
scrutiny and thereby help protect the right to a fair trial; (4) improving the
capacities of rightholders, as when one right promotes people's ability to
use, benefit from, and protect some other right.
Supporting relations have different strengths. Strong supporting relations can be defined in terms of logical or practical inconsistency. An assisting right strongly supports the assisted right when and only when it is
inconsistent-logically or as a practical matter-for a person to endorse the
implementation of the assisted right without endorsing the simultaneous
implementation of the assisting right. The inconsistency lies in trying to have
a functioning right without being willing to endorse something else that is
indispensable or necessary to its functioning.
Let a thick arrow, R1 4R2, represent a strong supporting relation from
one right (R1) to a second right (R2). This can be read as "right 1 strongly
supports right 2" or as "right 2 strongly depends on right 1." The right to
security against physical attack is practically indispensable to the full protection of the right to freedom of assembly. If people have no protection
against violent attacks it will sometimes be risky to assemble for unpopular
purposes. Thus, it is practically inconsistent to advocate implementing the
right to freedom of assembly while rejecting all rights to protections against
physical attack.
A baseline problem arises in assessing the indispensability of one right
to another. If we are considering whether the right to freedom of assembly is
indispensable to the right to equal protection of the law, should the baseline

10.

For some purposes it is useful to focus on supporting relations between different people's
rights. For example, a journalist exercising her right to freedom of expression may help
support the realization of a hungry person's right to adequate nutrition. See Craig Scott,
Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category of "Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights," 21 HuM. RTS.Q. 633, 645 (1999).
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situation be (1) the absence of any assemblies or (2) simply the numbers
and kinds of assemblies that would exist even without any specific protections for free assembly? The second baseline is the appropriate one because
it focuses on what the right itself contributes. It is a mistake to assert the
indispensability of the right to freedom of assembly to other rights on the
grounds that if no assemblies occurred this would be disastrous for other
rights. Indispensability should be assessed in light of the actual threat level
to assemblies and how much the recognition and implementation of a right
to freedom of assembly will do to reduce that level.
Weak supporting relations exist when the supporting right is useful but
not indispensable to the supported right. For example, a functioning right to
education is generally useful but not indispensable to a functioning right to
a fair trial in criminal cases. If R, is useful or even highly useful to R2 there
is no contradiction, logical or practical, in endorsing the implementation
of R2 without endorsing the simultaneous implementation of R1. Let a weak
supporting relation be represented by a thin arrow, R1-4R2.
To call some supporting relations "weak" is not to deny their importance. Many (perhaps most) supporting relations between rights are of the
weak variety. They make the supported right more secure without being
indispensable. For example, implementation of a right to free public education is highly useful to the implementation of most other rights because
its implementation improves levels of literacy, competency, and legal and
political knowledge.
Many good things carry with them evils, costs, and dangers. A thing that
is supporting also can be simultaneously damaging. For example, running
every day can be generally good for a person's overall health while causing
long-term damage to the joints. The same is possible in the realm of rights.
Security rights support rights to the fundamental freedoms, but the system
of criminal law used to implement security rights generates risks to those
freedoms. For a relation to be supportive, the beneficial support provided
must outweigh the damages and risks created. Countervailing harms and
risks should be taken into account when assessing the strength of supporting relations between rights. If a right does more harm than good to the
functioning of another, then, overall, it provides no support.
Redundancy in a structural system means that a component has more
support or reinforcement than is necessary to its strength or stability. For
example, if a tall radio antenna is supported both by strong diagonal braces
at its base and by a multitude of guy wires, the system has redundancy if
some of the supports could be removed without any loss to the stability of
the antenna. Some of the supports that other rights provide to freedom of
religion, for example, may be redundant. In the absence of some of those
supports people could continue to enjoy fully the right to freedom of religion.
Redundancy is relative to threat levels, however. Supports that are redundant
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in countries with low threat levels may be indispensable in countries with
high threat levels.
Supporting relations are sometimes, but not always, bidirectional. Strong
bidirectional support between rights can be represented by thick arrows in
both directions, R--R 2. For example, strong bidirectional support exists
between the full realization of the right to free and regular elections of
government officials and the full realization of the right to political participation. For a biological example consider that the liver's functioning is
indispensable to the heart's functioning, and vice versa (liver*- heart). This
is strong interdependence.
Weak bidirectional supporting relations create weak interdependence,
Ri<--R 2 For example, the right to freedom of speech is weakly supported by
and weakly supportive of the right to free public education. For a biological
example, the functioning of the left hand is useful but not indispensable to
the functioning of the right hand and vice versa (left hand<---right hand).
The third possibility is mixed-strength interdependence. Here there is
a strong supporting relation in one direction and a weak supporting relation in the other. The heart's functioning is indispensable to the functioning
of the hands, and the functioning of the hands is useful (in assisting with
eating, for example) but not indispensable to the functioning of the heart
(heart<-4hands). Mixed-strength interdependence of rights is perhaps illustrated by the fully realized right to freedom of movement and the fully
realized right to freedom of expression. Free movement is indispensable to
free expression, but free expression is not indispensable to free movement
(movement<-- expression). Henry Shue argued that security rights and
subsistence rights are basic in the sense that it is impossible to fully enjoy
any other rights if these families are not enjoyed." In his view, security
and subsistence are indispensable to each other and to all other rights, but
non-basic rights are, at best, useful to the basic rights (basic rights<-4'nonbasic rights).
Indivisibility is strong interdependence or indispensable bidirectional
support. If two items are mutually indispensable, then they are bidirectionally indivisible. You cannot destroy either without destroying both. The heart
and the liver are bidirectionally indivisible; one cannot function without
the other. Weak bidirectional supporting relations, however, do not create
indivisibility. A person's two hands are mutually supportive but not indivisible because one can function without the other. Mixed-strength supporting
relations create indivisibility in one direction but not the other. One can
sacrifice a hand to save a heart, but not a heart to save a hand.
Because weak supporting relations do not create indivisibility, they cannot be invoked as an explanation of why indivisibility occurs. Jack Donnelly
11.

HENRY SHUE,

BAsic

RICHTS

21-28 (2d ed. 1996).
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seems to make this mistake when he says, "The Universal Declaration model
treats internationally recognized human rights holistically, as an indivisible
structure in which the value of each right is significantly augmented by the
presence of many others." This fails to recognize the genuine possibility that
each right could be supported weakly by many others without this generating an indivisible structure.12 One can interconnect five sturdy freestanding
columns with millions of strings without making them indispensable to
each other.
System-wide indivisibility is strong interdependence between all of the
units in a system. Each unit is bidirectionally indispensable to every other
unit. A system of seven families of rights with system-wide indivisibility can
be represented as follows:

R14-R
R 2 +4R 3 +4R 4 +4R 5 +-4 R6 4R 7
System-wide indivisibility is interesting because under some circumstances
it precludes sacrificing any unit and because it equalizes priority between
the units. Some people who endorse the indivisibility of rights probably
mean to assert that system-wide indivisibility holds between all the families
of human rights, or even between each and every particular human right.
System-wide indivisibility is discussed in the next section.
The following claims have been defended in this section:
(1) Supporting relations between rights have different strengths that
range from useful to indispensable. Supporting relations can run in one (--)
or both (--4) directions. If two rights are useful to each other this is not
enough to make them indivisible. Indivisibility requires that the two rights
be indispensable to each other in a wide range of situations (-4).
(2) Indivisibility and interdependence are not the same relation, even
though both are bidirectional. Indivisibility between two or more rights
requires that they be mutually indispensable.

III. THE STRENGTH OF SUPPORT DEPENDS ON THE QUALITY OF
IMPLEMENTATION
So far we have discussed the functioning of rights, without sufficiently attending to how well they function. The quality of functioning or implementation
must now be introduced into the framework because of the fact that high
quality functioning generally requires more support from other elements in
a system than does low quality functioning.
Introducing the quality of functioning into the framework adds an additional element to the specification of supporting relations. Consider three
12.

JACKDONNELLY, UNIVERSALHUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE27

(2003).
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levels of implementation: (1) non-implementation (the right is unrecognized
or exists only on paper); (2) low quality implementation, and (3) high quality implementation. "Full realization" occurs when there is high quality
implementation of rights. High quality implementation requires more and
stronger support from other rights-and from conditions that are not themselves rights-than does low quality implementation. Further, rights with low
quality implementation provide less support to other rights than do rights
with high quality implementation.
A right is fully implemented or has high quality implementation when
all of the major threats to the right have been adequately blocked or neutralized through actions such as gaining recognition and compliance with
the right's associated moral and legal duties, providing protections and
other services, and providing legal and other remedies for noncompliance
with the right.13 Realization is the end and implementation is the means. In
some cases realizing a right requires little implementation. If governmental
officials and the public already accept the right and its associated duties,
threats may be few and implementation easy. In religiously tolerant Brazil,
for example, not much implementation is required for the realization of
the right to freedom of religion. In religiously divided Nigeria, on the other
hand, serious implementation is necessary.
It is now clear why the Teheran Proclamation mentioned full realization
("the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights is impossible").14 This was in recognition of the fact that what is indispensable to the full realization of a right
may not be indispensable to partial realization. Shue was also careful to
restrict to "full enjoyment" his claims that security and subsistence are indispensable to other rights.'" Restricting claims about indivisibility to those
countries where rights are fully realized means that these claims will have
little relevance to troubled and impoverished countries where at best rights
are only partially realized.
Sometimes countries only accept and implement narrow rights when
broad rights are called for. In such cases moving to better quality implementation involves giving rights more adequate scopes. A better-implemented right
is not necessarily one with a larger scope. It may simply do a better job of
protecting the original scope or extend the right to more people. Consider
an analogy between rights and insurance policies. 6 Inexpensive insurance
policies have large co-payment requirements and cover only a limited range
13.
14.
15.

16.

James W. Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 15 HUM.
RTS. Q. 77, 80-86 (1993); reprinted in abridged form in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT190, 190-91 (Henry Steiner, Philip Alston, & Ryan Goodman eds., 2007).
Proclamation of Teheran, supra note 1, ' 13.
SHUE, supra note 11, at 21, 24.
See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE
108, 176, 179, 204, 230, 248, 275, 277 (1971).
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of risks. More expensive policies reduce the co-payment and cover more
risks. Analogously, low quality implementation covers only some risks and
leaves all or some people to fend for themselves in particular areas. High
quality implementation of rights covers more people and risks, and relies
less on self-help. The more risks one attempts to eliminate, the greater the
costs and the amount of support needed from other rights.
Human rights problems sometimes take the form of low quality implementation for everyone, but they also frequently take the form of high quality
functioning for some and nonfunctioning for others-where these others
may be defined in terms of individuals, groups, or regions. In a developing
country, residents of the main cities may enjoy good quality implementation of some rights while rural people, particularly those in remote areas,
receive no protection whatsoever, or receive very inadequate and spotty
protection.
Unequal distribution of the benefits of rights need not be a matter of
formal exclusion from the group of rightholders. Even if rights are thought
of as rights of all citizens or persons, implementation can be very unequal
for different areas or different sorts of persons. Indeed, fully equal implementation is difficult and costly to achieve because it is frequently the case
that some people and groups are extremely vulnerable or live in distant or
troubled areas.
There are connections between quality and distribution. When the implementation of a right is of generally low quality, some people are likely to be
protected inadequately or not at all. For example, if the courts are poorly
organized, underfunded, and only found in regional centers, implementation of some people's due process rights is likely to be not merely poor
but nonexistent. Low quality implementation often addresses risks to some
of the population while totally or partially failing to address risks to other
parts of the population. It often leaves pockets of insecurity. Better-quality
implementation eliminates some of these pockets, and perfect implementation would eliminate them all.
The quality and distribution of the implementation of a supporting right
normally needs to reach a medium level before it begins to help much with
the realization of the supported right. If only a few of the people convicted
of serious crimes have access to an appeal process, and if the appeal process
is very slow and cumbersome, this does little to support the general fairness
of criminal trials-although it may give justice in a few particular cases. If
the benefits of a right depend on the creation of a public good such as a low
crime rate or an informed public, low quality implementation of the right
may mean that the public good never emerges. Doing a little but not much
to implement a right often fails to produce any support for other rights.
High quality implementation means that good legal and political institutions are in place and that those mechanisms work well in achieving
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respect and protection for people's rights. Still, high quality implementation
does not mean perfect implementation. Instead, it means the sort of implementation actually achieved by the countries today that are most successful in promoting and protecting human rights domestically. Further, high
quality implementation does not mean that the protections extend to every
imaginable threat. It is wise here to follow Shue in treating full realization
as a matter of having high quality protections against the main or standard
threats to the right. According to Shue, "[T]he social guarantees required by
the structure of a right are guarantees, not against all possible threats, but
only against what I will call standard threats. .

.

.People are [not] entitled

to social guarantees against every conceivable threat." 17 When we speak of
supporting relations between rights we mean assistance in dealing with the
standard threats. Potential assistance in dealing with nonstandard or exotic
threats will be insufficient to establish a supporting relationship. Even the
best insurance policies do not cover Martian invasions.
This section has defended the following theses.
(3) The strength of supporting relations between rights varies with the
quality and distribution of implementation. The high quality implementation
of a right requires (but also provides) more and stronger support from (to)
other rights. Rights with low quality implementation provide (and need) less
support to (from) other rights.
(4)A system of rights that has low quality implementation for most rights
will tend to have low levels of interdependence among its rights.
IV. AGAINST SYSTEM-WIDE INDIVISIBILITY

This section presents two arguments against system-wide indivisibility. The
first argument shows what a strong claim this is and suggests that counterexamples are available. The second argument shows that system-wide
indivisibility would have the implausible consequence that there can be no
priority variations among the rights in the system.
System-wide indivisibility requires strong bidirectional supporting relations (mutual indispensability) among all the families of rights. To assert
that system-wide indivisibility exists is a very strong claim, and it is only
remotely plausible under high quality implementation of all human rights.
Even in that happy situation, mutual indispensability is unlikely to hold
among all of the families of rights. All that is required for its absence is for
one family of rights to fail to be indispensable to all of the others, and there
are likely to be such cases. For example, it seems possible to have high
quality implementation of security rights together with nonrealization of
17.

SHUE,
supra note 11, at 29, 32.
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the fundamental personal freedoms. It also seems possible to have at least
medium quality implementation of the fundamental freedoms without full
realization of social rights.
The second argument against system-wide indivisibility requires the
introduction of the idea that the indivisibility of rights produces priority equalization. In general, if achieving A is genuinely indispensable to achieving B,
then whatever reasons an agent has for pursuing B are also equally strong
reasons for pursuing A. This principle transfers priority from a supported right
to its supporting right. When we realize that R,is truly indispensable to R2,
we realize that R1 has at least as much priority or importance as R2. If R1 is
useful but not indispensable to R2, the boost in priority that R2 gives to R,
will be much smaller. Weak supporting relations yield much smaller boosts
to the priority of the supporting right than strong supporting relations.
If there are many strong supporting relations among the members of
a group of rights, this tends to reduce variations in priority among those
rights. This is clearest in the case of system-wide indivisibility, because
it equalizes priority among all the rights (or families of rights) in the system. Suppose that we have system-wide indivisibility between four rights
(R 1 -R 2+-+R 3 "+R4). Suppose also that when we assess the priority of
those rights one-by-one without attending to the relations between them we
assign the following priority scores (using a ten point scale): R1 has priority 6;
R2 has priority 5; R3 has priority 7; and R4 has priority 9. When we consider
the fact that R2 is indispensable to 6 priority R, we raise R2's score to 6.
When we consider that R1 and R2 are indispensable to R3, we raise their
scores to 7. When we consider that R1 , R2, and R3 are indispensable to R4,
we raise their scores to R4's level (9). All four rights end up with a priority
score of 9. System-wide indivisibility equalizes priority at the level of the
highest priority right.
Weak supporting relations have a smaller impact on variations in priority. If R, is very useful but not indispensable to R2, then R, only inherits
part of R2's priority. If a set of rights is linked together by numerous weak
supporting relations but only by a few strong ones, substantial variations in
priority remain possible.
When two rights or families of rights are mutually indispensable this
equalizes their priority. It follows that if all families of human rights formed
an indivisible system then all the families would have the same priority. A
plausible objection to the existence of system-wide indivisibility is that it
contradicts the attractive idea that rights protecting people's lives have higher
priority than many other human rights. For example, many countries that
value both security and liberty nevertheless assign higher priority to protecting people's lives. Five murders committed by a government will yield
a much louder international outcry than twenty violations of freedom of
assembly. More generally, the fact that some rights are jus cogens and that
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some "super-rights" qualify for the protection of the International Criminal

Court also suggests that there is priority variation among human rights.18
Thus, if system-wide indivisibility implies that there is no priority variation
among families of human rights, and if that implication is implausible, then
system-wide indivisibility is implausible.
This objection to system-wide indivisibility might also defend the existence of priority variation by appealing to the non-derogation clauses found
in the European Convention on Human Rights, 19 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,20 and the American Convention on Human
Rights.21 These clauses permit the suspension of most rights during emergency situations but forbid the suspension of some very important rights.
It is doubtful, however, that the non-derogation clauses provide a sound
argument against system-wide indivisibility. The reason is that system-wide
indivisibility is only likely to exist under high quality implementation but
these emergency clauses are designed for extreme situations in which high
quality implementation for all rights is impossible to maintain. For example,
a disaster may make it impossible temporarily to run schools, conduct fair
criminal trials, or to ensure equality before the law. Further, appropriate
government responses to the emergency often involve restricting rights, such
as freedom of movement and assembly. Without high quality implementation of all the families of rights, priority equalization will not occur. Hence
it is possible for there to be priority variation among rights in emergency
situations even if no priority variation occurs in nonemergency situations in
which all the families of rights enjoy high quality implementation.
System-wide indivisibility, which occurs when all the families are indivisible, is a very strong notion. A slightly weaker notion may be useful.
Widespread indivisibility exists when most of the families are mutually
indispensable. The arguments given above against system-wide indivisibility
do not show that widespread indivisibility does not exist among the seven
families of rights. If widespread (but not system-wide) indivisibility exists
among all the families of human rights then this is of great interest.
System-wide indivisibility might be defended on the grounds that if all
human rights are derived from a single value, such as human dignity, the
18.
19.
20.
21.
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result will be that all the families of human rights will have a strong form of
unity akin to indivisibility.22 The threats to human dignity are quite varied,
however, and this results in families of rights that are equally varied. For
example, the threats addressed by the fundamental freedoms are mostly
different from the threats addressed by equality rights. Consider the following analogy: Just because all of the departments of an excellent hospital
are devoted to the promotion, preservation, and restoration of health, it
does not follow that a hospital cannot have surgery and internal medicine
departments but no department devoted to liver transplants, that there cannot be real competition between the hospital's departments, or that some
departments cannot be reduced or eliminated in order to cope with poor
economic conditions. A common origin in a single underlying value may
produce some sort of unity among institutions constructed to protect that
23
value, but it does not make these institutions indivisible.
This section has defended the following theses:
(5) System-wide indivisibility is not plausible at the level of seven families
of rights. It requires that each of the families be indispensable to all of the
others. If some families are much more supported than supportive in a wide
range of circumstances, then system-wide indivisibility will not obtain.
(6) If system-wide indivisibility really existed, it would be inconsistent
with the idea that some rights, or families of rights, have higher priority
than others.
(7) The priority variations implied by the derogation clauses are compatible with system-wide indivisibility because the measures taken to deal
with the emergency are likely to undermine high quality implementation
for some rights, and system-wide indivisibility is only likely to exist under
high quality implementation of all rights.

V. THE LIMITED RELEVANCE OF INDIVISIBILITY TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Claims about the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights have
much less relevance to developing countries than is commonly thought.
Developing countries trying to get into the realm of human rights are not
initially concerned with high quality implementation for all. A realistic shortterm aspiration for many developing countries would be to have low quality
implementation for most of the population. But such implementation yields
fewer and weaker supporting relations between rights. Bidirectional indispensability between all rights, or all families of rights, is unlikely to exist.
22.
23.
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Indivisibility, as formulated in the Teheran Proclamation, as well as
in Shue's theory of basic rights, is a thesis about supporting relations that
exist when rights are fully implemented or enjoyed.2 4 But most developing
countries are not in a position to fully implement all the rights for everyone.
Hence, claims of indivisibility and interdependence do not have much relevance to their situation. Thinking they do is a mistake based on failure to
attend to the quality and distribution of implementation. These claims will
be relevant only when these countries get closer to achieving high quality
implementation.
Another reason to doubt the relevance of claims about indivisibility and
interdependence to developing countries is that interdependent structures
are not necessarily built in ways that involve interdependence in the early
stages of construction. Consider as an analogy an arched stone bridge. Such
a bridge is a strongly interdependent structure in the sense that if you remove
any major piece from the arch the whole span will fall. But this interdependence does not mean that you have to build all parts of the bridge at one
time. Workers can carve some stones before others and build the ends of
the bridge before building the center. Temporary scaffolding or even earthen
ramps can provide temporary support for the arch during construction.
As this analogy suggests, some parts of a system of rights can be created
before others. For example, a country can achieve low quality implementation
of a system of criminal law and due process before protecting fundamental
freedoms. Trying to implement criminal law and due process before providing free public education may run into difficulties in places where educated
participants would be helpful in supporting the system of law and due process,
but perhaps temporary scaffolding can be arranged. If uneducated people who
are charged with crimes cannot understand the complexities of the operations of the criminal justice system and how best to defend their innocence,
temporary scaffolding might be arranged by providing free lawyers or lay
counselors to help them cope. If this is the case, then claims about indivisibility and interdependence do not imply that developing countries should
follow the policy of doing a little to implement every family of rights. It is
possible to pick and choose among rights in developing countries. Debate
should continue about how best to move from non-implementation to low
quality implementation and then on to high quality implementation. The
best way to sequence the implementation of various rights may depend on
country-specific factors such as where governmental capacities needed for
implementation are already in place or partially developed.
There is also reason to think that across-the-board partial implementation in its early stages creates few relations of support. Rights with very low

24.

SHUE, supra

note 11, at 21.

Rethinking Indivisibility

2008

levels of implementation do little to support other rights. The protection they
provide to other rights is like an insurance policy issued by a company that
has just come into business and as yet has no phones or claim adjusters.
This is not to say, however, that no supporting relations exist under low
quality implementation. The relations that do exist, however, will mostly
be of the weak variety.
System-wide indivisibility would be very bad news for human rights in
developing countries if it meant that moving into the realm of human rights
was an all-or-nothing matter, that is, if it implied that a developing country
had to implement all of the families in order to implement any of them.
Low quality implementation provides a way of easing into the realm of human rights, allowing some families to be implemented before others. Even
if system-wide or widespread indivisibility exists between the seven families
of rights under high quality implementation, this does not imply that such
strong interdependence exists under low quality implementation.
This section has defended the theses that:
(8) Claims about the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights
are of limited relevance to the situation of developing countries because
high quality implementation-which produces stronger relations of interdependence-is generally not an immediate possibility.
(9) Low quality implementation provides developing countries with
a way of easing into the realm of human rights. Even if system-wide or
widespread indivisibility exists under high quality implementation, this does
not imply that such strong indivisibility exists when the general quality of
implementation is low.

VI. LINKAGE ARGUMENTS BASED ON SUPPORTING RELATIONS
Linkage arguments defend controversial rights (such as economic and social
rights) by arguing that they are justified because they provide indispensable
support to some already justified or accepted rights (such as civil and political
rights). If R2 is already recognized as a justified right, and if it can be shown
that R, provides truly indispensable support for R2, then full implementation
of R2 requires simultaneous implementation of R1. Many theorists have used
linkage arguments. 25 Weak supporting relations only yield weak linkage arguments. The fact that R, is useful or even very useful to R2 provides a reason
for having R, but not a full justification. Because strong supporting relations
between rights will be rare in developing countries, linkage arguments will
have very limited immediate use in those countries.
25.
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The success of linkage arguments is less important if there are good
freestanding justifications for all seven families of rights. For example, the
right to freedom of religion does not provide indispensable support to most
other rights, but the small role it plays in supporting other rights does not
undermine it due to the availability of good freestanding justifications.
Linkage arguments are double-edged swords because their effect can be
to drag down the supported right rather than to justify the supporting right.
Suppose that R2 is thought to be justified, but just barely because of its high
costs. R2 does not have a large margin of justification that would allow it to
support new and heavy costs. 26 Also suppose that an indispensable supporting right R1 is not yet implemented. Under these assumptions, discovering
that the implementation of R1 is indispensable to the implementation of R2
may lead to the conclusion that R2 is not justified after all by revealing a
large area of unsuspected costs.
The conclusions of this section are:
(10) Linkage arguments only provide conclusive support for a right when
the supporting right being defended is indispensable to the supported right
whose high priority is already established or accepted.
(11) Linkage arguments have limited immediate use in developing
countries.

VII. CONCLUSION
This article has identified a number of possible mistakes that should be avoided in thinking about supporting relations between rights. They include:
(1) Ignoring differences in the strength of supporting relations (not recognizing that many supporting relations are useful but not indispensable).
(2) Using the wrong baseline in estimating the indispensability of one
right to another (proceeding as if no right to freedom of assembly meant
that no assemblies would occur).
(3) Not recognizing the difference between one-way and mutual support.
(4) Failing to attend to the quality of implementation and its effects on
the strengths of supporting relations.
(5) Failing to recognize that claims about what is necessary to the full
realization of a right have limited relevance to the situation of developing
countries.
Overall, this article has cast doubt on comfortable and often-repeated
claims about the indivisibility of human rights. The goal has been to encour26.
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age deeper and more useful thought about supporting relations between
rights. As an aid to such thought and study, a conceptual framework for
thinking about interdependence and indivisibility was constructed. When
one applies this framework it appears likely that the United Nations statements about indivisibility are broad overstatements of more modest truths.
One may have suspected this antecedently, but the framework helps one
understand how and why.

